A century later, Clausewitz's interpreters were much bolder. Endorsing the prevailing view, they decided that the undated note must have been composed in 1830 when we know from Marie that Clausewitz, who had been transferred from his post as the Director of the War School in Berlin to field service in the artillery, had been obliged to stop his work on »On War« and had packed and sealed his papers until time allowed him to resume writing. This date has had much appeal not least because it created the somewhat romantic picture of a fateful moment when Clausewitz, upon leaving his work to which he was never to return, left a final record of his intentions. From the 1930s there has therefore been a consensus among Clausewitz's interpreters regarding the dating of this note 3 .
What I would like to argue here is that this dating is highly improbable, that it created some difficult problems that scholars have failed to resolve, and, even more important, that it is conspicuously divorced from all that we know about Clausewitz's later development. I will suggest that the undated note was written in fact shortly prior to the note of July 1827, possibly only a few months before.
In the note of July 1827, Clausewitz assesses the far-reaching implications on his work of his new discovery that there are two types of war -absolute and limited -and that war is the continuation of policy by other means. With most of »On War« already written, he had to retract:
»Ich betrachte die ersten sechs Bücher, welche sich schon ins Reine geschrieben finden, nur als eine noch ziemlich unförmliche Masse, die durchaus noch einmal umgearbeitet werden soll.« 4
He therefore states his intention to work in the light of his new guidelines on Books 7 and 8, in both of which he has only sketched or outlined several chapters [»entworfen«, »Skizzen« for Book 7, and »entworfen« for Book 8.] Then, after finishing the original plan of the work, he will return to revise the first six books 5 . Now, the undated note was allegedly written in 1830. Yet it reveals no progress on the state of affairs described in July 1827. In fact, if it were not for the basic assumption, I would suggest that one would have had to admit that the undated note represents, if 45 MGM 1/89
anything, a slight regression on the note of July 1827. Let us examine the texts. In the note of July 1827, Book 6 is undistinguished among the first six completed -though unrevised -books of »On War«. In contrast, in the undated note, Clausewitz, while appearing to single out Book 6 for especially harsh treatment, describes it as a mere attempt or sketch [»bloßer Versuch«] 6 . This is particularly puzzling since Book 6, as we know it, comprises more than a fourth of the whole work, and is 2.5 to 3. Since we know that the beginning of Book 1 indeed represents the latest stage in the development of Clausewitz's ideas, this statement has been perceived as the latest account of the revision of his work. This brings us to the core of the argument. Interpreters who have had the note of July 1827 in mind, have overlooked something very fundamental. In the undated note Clausewitz does not mention any revision nor does he even allude to the ideas of policy and war, or absolute, limited and real wars. In short, he does not refer to what was in 1830 the focus of his work and his major concern for the future, to what is universally supposed to have been the whole purpose of the note. Indeed, assuming this purpose, Clausewitz's account appears strangely obscure. He fails to enlighten us about the things that were the most important to him. Instead he presents a very long list of propositions which are intended to prove the possibility of a general theory of war, and which summarize major themes from »On War«. Curiously enough, the ideas of policy and war, and absolute, limited or real war do not appear here either. The undated note could not have been written in 1830. If this is so then how are we to understand Clausewitz's reference to the first chapter of Book 1 as the only one he regarded as finished? I would suggest that a remarkable coincidence was responsible here for the misinterpretation, but this is better explained from the beginning.
The undated note appears to have been composed shortly before the note of July 1827, possibly early in the same year. It was written when and because Clausewitz discovered that there was a problem in regarding all-out war as the only type of war and the sole foundation of theory. We know this happened while he was writing Book 6, or perhaps when he was already copying it. The whole of his intellectual enterprise now appeared in jeopardy. Hence a dominant characteristic of the note -its melancholic tone. Apart from the fact that Clausewitz declares that most of his work is unsatisfactory and should be regarded merely as »working material«, he devotes the larger part of the note to the assessment of the question whether a theory of war, despite its »extraordinary difficulties«, is possible at all. Although his tone appears to be unusually subdued, he answers in the affirmative, relying on the list of propositions which he regards as universal and which are taken from the first books of »On War«. This brings us to another dominant characteristic of the note: in Clausewitz's intellectual development it is patently archaic 12 . As mentioned, there is no trace of his new ideas. The exciting and fundamental arguments of Book 8 cannot be found in the list of propositions. Interestingly enough, the opening theme in the list is the relationship between defence and attack -the subject of Book 6. Indeed, let us return to Clausewitz's account of his work in the note and examine it in the light of our new date. Clausewitz describes Book 6 as a mere attempt or sketch [»bloßer Versuch«] and states that he will rewrite it entirely and look for another »way out« [»Ausweg«] . Assuming as he did that the note was written in 1830, Aron believed that Clausewitz deemed it necessary to revise his views on defence and attack in the light of his new ideas on policy and war 13 . While this might be true, it still does not explain why Book 6 is singled out.
Surely, the same revision was needed for all of Clausewitz's early books, particularly Book 3 dealing with strategy. However, once we redate the note, all this becomes much clearer. When he was writing Book 6, Clausewitz encountered a major problem -the possibility of a defence with a limited aim. Not only did he now become dissatisfied with Book 6 but he sensed that the problem might have bearing on all his previous work. While there were now question marks on all his work, Clausewitz had not yet clarified to himself the exact nature and full implications of the problem, and still believed that at least the fundamentals of his work remained unaffected whatever the adaptations and additions he would have to make. In case of an early death, he wanted the world to know both sides of the coin. He therefore stated that the first chapter of Book 1 -which one would expect that in the early phase of »On War« also dealt with the question »What is War?« and encapsulated Clausewitz's fundamental view on the subjectwas the only one that he regarded as finished, and that it indicated the direction he wanted to follow everywhere 14 .
In the last two books of »On War«, only the main topics of Book 7 were roughly sketched. In Book 8 there was the main idea but apparently nothing substantial written 15 .
Now, whereas Clausewitz wrote the undated note when he sensed that he encountered a difficult problem, he composed the note of July 1827 when he began to clarify to himself the nature and implications of this problem and work out a solution for it. This proximity of time and subject is responsible for the remarkable similarity between the two notes which in many respects are almost a mirror image of one another. In this note he presented his two new ideas and their implications on his work. The first six books, which were already in a clean copy, would now have to be revised. However, he would first work on and finish the last two books. Book 7 »On Attack«, which apparently remained in the state it had been when the earlier note had been written, would be revised and completed. After finishing this book, he would go at once and work out Book 8 in full. This Book, »War Plans«, is where his new ideas would really be elaborated 17 . This process would be of crucial importance:
»Bin ich nun durch die Ausarbeitung dieses achten Buchs mit meinen Ideen ins Klare gekommen, und haben die großen Lineamente des Krieges sich gehörig festgestellt: so wird es mir dann um so leichter werden, diesen Geist in die ersten sechs Bücher über-zutragen, und jene Lineamente auch hier überall durchschimmern zu lassen. Also erst alsdann werde ich die Umarbeitung der sechs ersten Bücher vornehmen.« How did this working plan materialize between 1827 and 1830 when Clausewitz had to stop his work? As mentioned, when the undated note was designated the date 1830, all had to agree that Clausewitz appeared neither to have made substantial progress nor to follow his planned programme. Now we have no »Final Note«, yet the course of Clausewitz's work during his last three creative years becomes quite clear and consistent with the »On War« that we know. As he had stated he would do, he first worked on and completed Book 7 »On Attack«, inserting his new idea of the two types of war in Chapters 15 and 16. He then went on to write and finish the large Book 8, »War Plans«, the natural place and the real testing ground of the new ideas. Only after developing these ideas extensively and clarifying his thoughts in writing this book, he undertook the revision of the first six books.
How When we remember that the first Books of »On War« were in a clean copy, Marie's testimony becomes even clearer. In going back to revise these books Clausewitz apparently did not literally rewrite them completely. He merely rewrote, amended and added sections (some of which were obviously quite extensive) to be incorporated into the existing text.
All this fits perfectly with another piece of evidence. We know from Marie that in November 1831, after concluding his mission on the Polish frontier and shortly before his death, Clausewitz hoped to finish his work during the course of that winter 21 . If it is assumed, by dating the undated note 1830, that between 1827 and 1830, he made very little progress in writing Books 7 and 8 and that these books remained but sketches, this hope appears peculiarly optimistic. However, once the basic assumption is abandoned, Clausewitz's hope is revealed in a new light. He wrote the now extensive Books 7 and 8, and revised Book 1 which he had naturally anticipated -as we know from the note of July 1827 -to be the most affected by the revision and the application of the new ideas 22 . In the winter of 1831 he therefore believed that he was mainly left with the incorporation of these ideas into the rest of the text of »On War« -surely no small task, but far smaller than the one interpreters have assumed.
If indeed we no longer possess a »final note« with Clausewitz's own testimony, then which parts of »On War« did he regard as truly finished before his death? This question appears to me to be somewhat misleading, because since the intellectual transformation of July 1827, Clausewitz's ideas were undergoing continuous development. The idea of limited war which appeared in the end of Book 6 and which was later incorporated into Book 7, was supplemented in the note of July 1827 by the idea of the relationship between policy and war. Both ideas were then worked out in Book 8 where Clausewitz continued to elaborate his thoughts. Chapters 1 and 2 of Book 1 reveal a further development where Clausewitz no longer regards absolute war as superior to real war. There is no evidence that the revision went any further in Book 1 and there was indeed no reason why any of the other chapters of this book should have been affected by Clausewitz's new ideas. As it is, Books II-V of »On War« were completely unrevised but the revision was probably needed most badly in Book 3, on strategy. In the more advanced part of »On War«, it is doubtful whether Clausewitz deemed further considerable revision of Books 6 and 7 necessary, but he probably wanted to bring 
